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1.1  Content
I. The notion of a fiction and the object of cognition in legal science. The opposi-
tion to “reality”. The actuality of nature and the actuality of the law. The extension 
of Vaihinger’s concept of a fiction. True fictions of legal theory. The legal subject.
II. The so-called “fictions” of legal practice. The pseudo-fictions of the legisla-
tor. Their fundamental difference from epistemological fictions; the absence of a 
cognitive aim and the absence of an opposition to the actuality of nature or the 
actuality of the law. Article 347 of the German Commercial Code. The praesumptio 
iuris. The praetorian fictions.
III. “Fictions” in the application of the law. The analogy. Its uncorrectable con-
flict with the actuality of the law and its juristic inadmissibility. The legally required 
analogy.
IV. Legal theory and legal practice. The moral fiction of “freedom“. Its dispens-
ability in the case of a dissolution of the faulty syncretism of the perspectives of is 
and ought. The fiction of the “social contract” establishing the state. Its dispens-
ability for legal positivism.
V. The sovereignty of the legal order. The independence of law from morality. 
The allegedly fictitious character of this separation. Vaihinger’s “practical” fictions. 























































H. Kelsen and C. Kletzer2
1.2  I
A considerable part of Vaihinger’s notable theory of fictions has been developed by 
reference to the so called “juridic” fictions. As a matter of fact, Vaihinger under-
stood juridic fictions to a paradigmatic case of fictions. For him, apart from math-
ematics, there was hardly another field better suited to the deduction of logical laws, 
to the illustration or development of logical methods in general, and of the method 
of the fiction in particular, than the law. He further expressed his regret about the 
fact that logicians have so far neglected the juridic fiction since they did not see that 
logic has to take its subject material from an actually living science.1 For Vaihinger 
the juridic fictions are “scientific” fictions2 and they do not in principle differ from 
epistemological fictions.3 He explicitly stresses “the formal identity of the actions 
of understanding and of the whole intellectual state in juridic fictions with all the 
other scientific fictions”.4
However, the notion of a “juridic fiction” captures quite a broad variety of phe-
nomena: only a relatively small part of them can be seen as fictions in the actual 
sense of this term, i.e. as fictions according to Vaihinger’s own definition. After all, 
most of the phenomena which Vaihinger himself treated as “juridic fictions” and 
which he uses to lay the foundations of his meritorious theory, are no fictions at all; 
at least they do not serve as examples of the intellectual constructs, to which the 
very qualities apply which he so fittingly describes. Thus, even though we have to 
unreservedly agree with the main results of Vaihinger’s philosophy of the As-If, it 
is especially in relation to the juridic fictions, i.e. in relation to the kind of fictions 
Vaihinger prefers to use, that the arguments have to be seen to be unconvincing.
According to Vaihinger a fiction is characterised both by its end and by the means 
through which this end is reached. The end is the cognition of the actual world; the 
means, however, is a fabrication, a contradiction, a sleight of hand, a detour and 
passage of thought. It might be a somewhat odd means, the fiction is nevertheless 
a means that logic uses; it has epistemological character and has its relevance as an 
instrument of cognition.5
It is the cognition of actual reality which the fiction serves. “The conscious turn-
ing away from actual reality is meant to prepare the cognition of the latter.”6 And 
the opposition to actual reality is one of the principal characteristics of the fiction.7
Now, it has to appear doubtful from the very beginning whether in the natural 
sciences we could ever come across fictions which do not in their essence aim at 
the cognition of actual reality. If we take a fiction to be an—admittedly somewhat 




5 Ibid 175 ff and passim.
6 Ibid. 27.






























































1 On the Theory of Juridic Fictions. With Special … 3
odd—means to grasp actual reality, then only a view of legal science which has 
completely strayed off its usual ways could make use of a fiction in this sense, and 
accordingly a fiction in this sense could never yield legal scientific cognition, not 
even in an indirect sense, via a detour. If by means of a fiction we claim the actuality 
of something (and be that in contradiction to actuality itself), then in a scientific en-
deavour which does not even attempt the cognition of something existing in actual 
reality, a fiction can only ever be an illegitimate and completely useless, viz. only 
harmful error.
As a matter of fact, Vaihinger was himself well aware of the true nature of legal 
science! He repeatedly stresses that the task of legal science is not to gather knowl-
edge of something that exists in actual reality. “So far the only truly scientific fiction 
we talked about was the juridic fiction; however, it needs to be stressed that legal 
science is not actually an empirical science, a science that deals with what actually 
exists, but a science that deals with human, arbitrary institutions.”8 Legal science 
aims at the knowledge of an ought; calling this object“human arbitrary institutions” 
is not entirely correct, since human arbitrary institutions, too, are something actual 
and can be objects of an empirical science, e.g. of sociology.
However, no grave objection to Vaihinger’s theory of fictions emerges from all 
of this. What emerges is only a significant modification. After all, legal science does 
indeed make use of fictions. We will demonstrate below, what kind of fictions these 
are and that most of Vaihinger’s “juridic fictions” are not true fictions at all. All that 
needs to be said here is that Vaihinger’s concept of a fiction becomes too narrow, as 
soon as one allows only empirical reality to be the object, the only target or product 
of cognition. And insofar as one wants to accept as sciences also those sciences 
which are not natural sciences, such as, for instance, ethics and, in particular, legal 
science, then such a restrictive understanding of fictions cannot be accepted. A thus 
appropriately expanded concept of a fiction emerges, as soon as we replace “actual 
reality” as the specific object of cognition with this “object of cognition” itself, 
understood in general terms. And we have to speak of a fiction as soon as cognition 
(and especially juridic cognition) takes a detour in knowing its object (and in juridic 
knowledge this object is the law, the legal order, the legal ought), a detour in which 
it consciously sets itself in contradiction to this object; and be it only in order to bet-
ter grasp it: just like a rock-climber, in order to avoid an obstacle and reach his goal 
more easily, is sometimes forced to temporarily climb downwards, i.e. in a direction 
directly opposed to his goal, the peak.
It is in this sense that there are true, i.e. epistemological fictions in legal science. 
They are fictions of the attempt to know the law, fictions of the intellectual mastery 
of the legal order. They are fictions of legal theory. Such a fiction, an auxiliary 
concept, an auxiliary construct, is, for instance, the concept of a legal subject or the 
concept of a subjective right.
In this context we do not need to fully investigate the concept of a legal subject 
or a person in all its facets. What should suffice is to show how fruitful the applica-


























































H. Kelsen and C. Kletzer4
In the common juristic understanding a person—and be it the physical person or 
the legal person—exists as an object distinct and independent from the legal order. 
We usually call this objectthe “bearer” of duties and rights and attribute to it more 
or less actual existence in the real world. Whether one wants to limit this kind of 
independent existence to the physical person or wants to extend it also to the so 
called legal person (like the organic theory wants to do) does not matter here. What 
suffices is to note the marked tendency to posit the person as something that exists 
in actual reality.
Now, if the physical as well as the legal subject can be shown to be nothing but 
the personification of a complex of norms9 for the purposes of simplification and 
illustration—something which cannot be comprehensively demonstrated in this ar-
ticle—then the idea of a person, which is commonplace in legal theory, would be a 
typical example of a fiction; and Vaihinger has to be credited with making the inter-
esting and complex thought-mechanism of the latter transparent. It is an intellectual 
construct which aims at capturing the object of legal science, i.e. the legal order, yet 
is nevertheless itself merely a product of imagination and is in thought added to the 
object of cognition. It is thus somehow a duplication of the object and a distortion 
of cognition. By that, this mere aid-to-thinking sets itself in direct opposition to the 
object, i.e. to the specific legal reality, and becomes in itself contradictory, just like 
any analysis of the concept of the person would reveal. Now, if the person (which 
was originally only set up as a specific aid-to-thinking, as a mere framework aimed 
at grasping the legal order) is posited to be an actually existing thing, i.e. as a kind 
of natural object, then a thus enhanced fiction does indeed involve an opposition to 
actual reality, which can only be possible in the transgression of a legal theory, thus 
in a theory that claims to have natural facts as its objects.
The concept of a legal subject is primarily a kind of fiction which Vaihinger calls 
a “personifying fiction”. They emerge from our tendency to anthropomorphically 
personify intellectual constructs, a tendency which has forever dominated our intel-
lectual capacities, and which forms this “undying inclination of man10 to hyposta-
sise everything which is purely intellectual into the shape of a person or subject and 
to thus make it intelligible. “The common principle is the hypostasis of phenomena 
in some respect, irrespective of how far the hypostasis aligns itself with this image 
of the person. This image of the person is also the truly determining factor in the cat-
egory of the thing.”11 “The basic scheme of substantiality is, after all, personality.”12 
This does indeed apply to the personifications of the law (i.e. of the legal norm), 
and it is in this way that we have to understand the legal subject. The legal norm, 
i.e. the fact that certain human behaviour ought to be a certain way, presents itself 
as the hypostasis of this purely intellectual object. And the insight that the concept 
9 In the case of the personification of the legal order as a whole we arrive at the so-called person 






























































1 On the Theory of Juridic Fictions. With Special … 5
of a thing is also a personifying fiction lets the legal subject and the subjective right, 
which are somehow understood as “things” appear to be quite similar, if not identi-
cal hypostases of the “objective” legal norm. It cannot be stressed enough that the 
concept of the legal subject has the same logical structure as the most characteristic 
form of personifying fiction, i.e. of the concept of the soul, or the concept of force,13 
the logical untenability of which does not militate against its actual practicability. It 
would certainly be a worthwhile endeavour to try to understand the legal person as a 
kind of legal soul. And it is by no means moot to clarify that the concepts of ethical 
personhood and of the “conscience”, too, are illustration-serving personifications 
of a norm, namely the moral norm. Vaihinger very appropriately characterises this 
duplication of the object of cognition which is effected in the fiction in general, and 
in the personification in particular, and one could not describe this strange duplica-
tion of the law, this tautology, which can be found in the legal subject, better than 
with the words of Vaihinger, who in this passage did not intend to capture the legal 
concept of the person, but the concept of a force: “It was especially the seventeenth 
century which has created many of these concepts in its sciences;14 it was believed 
that by means of these concepts one has actually understood something; however, 
such words are but shells, which are supposed to hold together and contain a mate-
rial nucleus. And just as the shell in all its forms traces the nucleus and in duplicat-
ing the latter simply represents it externally, so these words or concepts are but 
tautologies, which simply repeat the actual thing in external clothing.”15
The contradictions, which are posited in the notion of a legal subject, which 
claims to be a thing distinct from the legal norm (of the “objective law”), but which 
is just the latter’s repetition, these contradictions may not be resolved, but they at 
least become transparent to us as soon as we accept (after Vaihinger has told us), 
that it lies within the nature of fictions to entangle us in contradictions. “By its very 
own doing thought leads us onto certain pseudo-concepts just as seeing leads us 
into unavoidable optical illusions. As soon as we recognise this optical semblance 
as being necessary, as soon as we consciously accept the fictions created by it (e.g. 
God, freedom etc.) and also see through them we can bear the ensuing logical con-
tradictions as necessary products of our thought and reach the insight that they are 
the necessary consequences of the inner mechanism of the thinking organ itself.”16
This is why the fiction of the legal subject, which is in itself contradictory, can 
nevertheless be accepted without harm to legal science, since it has the advantages 
of illustration and simplification. This, however, is true only as long as and insofar 
as one remains aware of its fictitious character and of the duplication which is ef-
fected by means of the concept of the person. Until then we can dispense of what 
Vaihinger calls the correction of the fiction. “Insofar as the fiction presents an op-
position to actual reality, it can only have value if it is employed provisionally. This 
13 Ibid 50.
14 It has to be noted here, that Schloßmann (1906) also traces the concept of the legal person back 



























































H. Kelsen and C. Kletzer6
is why … it needs to be corrected.”17 “The mistake has to be reversed by simply dis-
charging of the construct which was fictitiously introduced.”18 Vaihinger expressly 
states: “Such a correction does not seem to be necessary for juridic fictions; and 
it indeed is not necessary. Since here we are not dealing with an exact estimation 
of something actual, but with a subsumption under an arbitrary law, a man-made 
construct, not a natural law, not a natural relation.a19 However, Vaihinger thereby 
does not really refer to the kind of fictions which are found in the legal concept of a 
person. The latter concept is created by legal science, by legal theory or the cogni-
tion of law. This is not the case with thewith the “juridic” fictions employed by the 
legislator or someone applying the law. However, it is to these that Vaihinger mainly 
refers even though they are intellectual constructs which do not serve cognition 
and are thus not fictions in the logical sense. Still, Vaihinger’s comments pertain 
precisely to the fiction of the legal subject employed by legal theory. However, 
by claiming that in legal science we do not intend to capture an actual reality he 
has characterised the essence of legal science as opposed to natural science only in 
a negative sense. Put positively, legal science intends to comprehend an ought, it 
intends the cognition of norms.
The concept of the legal person can be employed with benefit as long as it is un-
derstood in accordance to its own logical structure, i.e. as a mirror image. However, 
this concept has not been able to avoid the danger that comes with any personifi-
cation: its hypostatisation into an actual object of nature. Insofar as theory takes a 
mere mirror image as an actual thing, it stretches the contradiction—one by which 
the law as subject (i.e. the legal subject) already stands, in and of itself and before 
any position of actuality exists, against the law as object (i.e. the objective law)—to 
a contradiction against actuality. In the concept of a legal person a natural thing is 
claimed to exist, which never and nowhere exists in actual reality. This is true both 
for the contradictione contradic concept has not been a Vaihinger aptly compares 
the fictitious constructs of thought with ere exists in actual reality. This is true both 
for the “physical” and for the so-called “legal” person. Vaihinger aptly compares 
the fictitious constructs of thought with “knots and nodes” which thought ties into 
the threads presented to it, “knots and nodes … which provide ancillary service to 
thought, which, however, become pitfalls for thought, as soon as the knot is taken as 
something that is contained in experience itself.”20 It is precisely this illicit positing 
of the person as being something actual which leads—as Vaihinger has shown in 
relation to the other fictions—to all the“pseudo problems”, the “artificially created 
difficulties”, the “self created contradictions” which abound in the doctrine of the 
“legal” person just as they abound in all philosophical and scientific theories that 





21 ‘A solution of the so-called ultimate puzzle of the world will never be found, since that 
which seems puzzling to us, is the contradictions created by us, which emerge from the playful 


























































1 On the Theory of Juridic Fictions. With Special … 7
At least here, however, a “correction” has to step in, and this correction can hap-
pen in no way other than by a reduction of the concept of the person to its natural 
boundaries, by means of a self-reflection of legal science, by means of a clarifica-
tion of its logical structure. If one had not demanded from the legal concept of the 
person more than it can in its essence provide, then one could have been spared the 
entirely fruitless discussion which has developed around the person, and in particu-
lar around the concept of the “legal” person; then the downright naive and paradox 
blunders of juridic theory and the excesses of an organic theory could have been 
avoided, blunders and excesses which can only be explained by reference to the 
delusive power of fictions, which also mislead scientific thought, and which lost 
itself in juristic mysticism.
1.3  II
What needs to be clearly distinguished from the fictions of legal theory are the 
so-called “fictiones juris”, the fictions of legal practice, i.e. of the legislator and 
of the application of the law. Now, as firstly concerns the “fictions” employed by 
the legislator, the fictions within the legal order, it must be stressed that these do 
not constitute “fictions” in Vaihinger’s sense. After all, the positing of a norm, the 
legislative activity, is not a process of thought, and does not have cognition as its 
goal. It is rather an act of will, if indeed we want to see it as a process or a proce-
dure at all. The legal order is expressed in words and these words undoubtedly of-
ten display the grammatical form which normally is found behind epistemological 
fictions: the“As-If”. However, due to the lack of any aim of cognition within the 
legal order—which as such is the object of cognition, and not itself cognition or an 
expression of cognition—the words of a legal norm can never contain a “fiction” in 
Vaihinger’s sense.
Let us immediately have a look at the example Vaihinger uses in his chapter 
on “juridic fictions”: article 347 of the German Commercial Code “where it is 
stipulated that a good which is not in time returned to the sender has to be treated 
as if it had been approved and accepted by the receiver.”22 In this example we are 
supposed to immediately see the identity in principle between the analogous fic-
tions, e.g. the categories, and the juridical fictions. However, in the categories, just 
as in all true fictions, the human intellect aims to comprehend actuality or some 
other object. In the fiction of Article 347, however, neither actuality nor anything 
else is intended to be comprehended, it should rather be regulated, a norm of ac-
tion is given, i.e. an actuality is supposed to be created. Of course, there is a deep 
connection between the intellect which orders the world by employing categories 
and which thus creates the world as ordered unity, on the hand, and the law that 
regulates and thus creates the legal word, on the other. However, the difference of 
principle between the epistemological and juridic fiction of the legislator shows in 






























































H. Kelsen and C. Kletzer8
the fact that in the latter case there can never be found an opposition to actuality, 
be it to the actuality of nature, or be it to the actuality of law (i.e. of the law as an 
object of cognition). Such a contradiction could only be found in a statement about 
what is (and if one wants to accept the extended concept of a fiction here proposed: 
about that what ought to be). However, the law cannot include such a statement. In 
a law no cognition is expressed. The statements in which the law expresses itself 
are not statements in this sense. Article 347 by no means states that the goods not 
returned in time to the sender are actually approved and accepted. It simply states 
that in case goods are not returned in time the same norm applies as in the case the 
goods are accepted; it states that in this case the sender and the receiver have the 
same duties and the same rights as in the case of actual acceptance. Article 347 
stipulates that goods not returned in time have to be treated just as goods which 
are accepted. The grammatical form of the “As-If” thus is not in any way essential, 
it can be replaced by a mere “just as”. If the law subsumes two cases under the 
same norm, it by no means claims that both cases are alike—in the sense of natu-
rally alike. Or otherwise every general norm would be “fiction” since there are 
no two men, two facts  which are alike. However, “legally” they are effectively, 
actually and truly alike, since they are made alike by the legal order. Article 347 is, 
just like any so-called “fiction” of the legislator, nothing but an abbreviating ex-
pression. The law simply wants to attach the same legal consequences to one case 
as it does to another. To phrase this in a separate norm would be too cumbersome, 
too laboured; or maybe the second case was not even considered in the first place. 
It would be superfluous to repeat all the rules which have already been set down 
for the first case. The legislator can rest content with declaring that in the second 
case the same rules apply as in the first case. It is a misunderstanding to suppose 
that this effect would be achieved by forcing the person applying the law to accept 
the idea that both cases are alike, i.e. that they do not differ as a matter of fact. That 
they are “legally” the same simply means that despite a natural difference in fact 
the same legal consequence is supposed to follow. And this difference of fact can 
by no means be ignored in applying the law. The judge first has to establish the 
facts; he has to establish whether the goods were accepted or whether they were 
not returned in time. If the recipient claims: I have not accepted the goods, then it 
has to be established that he did not return them in time. Where do we here find 
the opposition to reality?
In the context of distinguishing between the fictio juris (the fiction of the leg-
islator) from the praesumptio, Vaihinger defines the juridic fiction as follows: 
“In the praesumptio a presumption is made until the opposite is established. By 
contrast, the fiction is the assumption of a statement, of a fact, even though the op-
posite is certain.” He uses the following example: “If a man, whose wife commits 
adultery, nevertheless is treated as the father of the child born from this adulterous 
relation when in fact he was actually in the country at the time of the conception, 
then he is treated as if he were the father, even though he is not the father and even 





























































1 On the Theory of Juridic Fictions. With Special … 9
from the fictio.”23 However, even though it is quite correct to insist on a distinc-
tion between the fictio and praesumptio, the fictio is not accurately captured here. 
The law does not claim that under certain conditions the husband is the father, i.e. 
the natural father, the progenitor of a child which has been conceived in an adul-
terous relation. The law does not make any such claim; it does not assume a matter 
of fact, even though the opposite is certain. Rather it only regulates for certain 
reasons and to certain ends, that under certain circumstances the husband has the 
same duties and rights in relation to a child which was conceived by his wife in an 
adulterous relation and that this child has the same duties and rights in relation to 
this husband as they exist between the husband and his own children which were 
conceived in wedlock. Now if the law uses the phrase, that the husband under 
given circumstances is treated “as father” of the illegitimate child, that he is to be 
treated “as if” he was the legitimate father, then this is nothing but the abbrevi-
ated formulation of a legal norm. No opposition to actuality is therein in any way 
posited. After all, one can, without committing such a contradiction to reality, 
even claim in terms of legal theory that the husband is the father in a legal sense, 
that he is the “legal” “father” of the illegitimate child, as long as by means of the 
term “father” one constructs a specific legal concept, i.e. the subject of particular 
duties and rights, personification of a particular complex of norms. A fiction in 
the sense of a contradiction to actuality would only emerge if one identified this 
legal notion of a “father” with thenatural object of the male progenitor who bears 
the same name. Such a fiction, however, would be plainly mistaken, harmful and 
completely unnecessary. It would be the same fiction as the one characterised 
above in the hypostatisation of the legal person into the natural fact of man, or 
the “real” organism. And in this case it would be a fiction of legal theory, i.e. of 
an activity directed at the cognition of the law, and not of the legislators, whose 
activity is directed at the creation of the law.
One of the greatest achievements of Vaihinger’s analysis is the insight into the 
deep relation between the mathematical method and the conceptual technique of 
legal science.24 However, the complete identification of in particular the legisla-
tive fiction with the fictions of mathematics surely is mistaken. “The similarity of 
method of both sciences is not limited to their basic concepts, which in both fields 
are of purely fictitious nature, but equally shows in their entire methodological pro-
cedures. As concerns the latter, what we have to deal with in both fields most of the 
time is to subsume a singular case under a universal, the determinations of which 
should only be applied to this singular. However, the singular resists this subsump-
tion. For the universal is not comprehensive enough to comprehend the singular 
under itself. In mathematics we have to deal, for instance, with the case of having to 
subsume warped lines under the straight ones; after all, this has the great advantage 
of allowing us to make computations with them. In legal science we want to bring 
the single case under a law in order to apply the benefits and criminal sanctions of 
the latter to the former. Now, in both cases a relation, which in actually does not 
23 Ibid 258.




























































H. Kelsen and C. Kletzer10
pertain is seen to pertain: thus, for instance, the warped line is taken to be straight 
and the adoptive son is taken to be the actual son. A warped line never is straight 
and an adoptive son never is an actual son; or, to take another example: the circle 
should be conceived of as an ellipse; in legal science the defendant who does not 
show up in court, is treated as if he submitted to the charge, and in case of demerit 
the appointed heir is treated as if he had died before the deceased testator.” 25 How-
ever, Vaihinger seems to overlook the fundamental difference between the thought 
processes of mathematics and the formulations of the legislator: it is true, in both 
cases we want to subsume a single case under a universal norm or concept, where, 
however, the norm or concept is not universal, not broad enough to capture the 
single case in question. But what does the legislator do? He simply broadens the 
norm, he extends it to the new case—and he does so without any fiction, without 
any contradiction to actuality. The new case relates to the extended norm in no 
way differently than any other case relates to the norm regulating it. The intended 
relation is established; within the field of law this relation it is not a relation which 
“cannot in actual reality be established”, but it is effectively established in the “ac-
tuality” of the law. In contrast, mathematics claims that the circle is an ellipse and 
that the warped line is straight and thereby sets an opposition to reality. However, 
the law does not claim—after all it does not claim anything—that the adoptive son 
is an actual son, that the defendant who does not show up has actually submitted to 
the charge, or that the unworthy heir died before the testator. It only “claims”, i.e. 
it posits—and this positing stands in opposition to nothing—that the same norms 
apply to the adoptive son as apply to the actual son—just as it posits that certain 
norms apply to men and women alike irrespective of their gender difference—and 
it posits, that the failure of the defendant to appear in front of a court has the same 
legal consequences as the acceptance of the claim, etc.
Similarly, no true fiction can be found in the principle of English law, which 
Vaihinger uses as an example of a fiction: the king can do no wrong.26 The king 
“truly” can do no wrong insofar as the legal norm withdraws its validity in relation 
to him. After all, “wrong” is no natural fact. A “wrong” is a matter of fact only in its 
relation to a legal norm, only by means of the fact that it is included as content in a 
prescriptive norm, or as a condition in a legal norm that prescribes punishment or 
a sanction. Insofar as the legal order does not forbid acts or omissions of the king, 
insofar as it does not make them conditions of punishment or a sanction, there is no 
wrong of the king. The principle of Austrian and German law, which is analogous 
to the English principle, i.e. the monarch is immune, simply creates the legal fact, 
to which alone a legal fiction could stand in opposition. The mistaken view, that a 
wrong would be a natural fact, that murder was a legal wrong, even when it were not 
forbidden by law or threatened by a sanction, creates the opinion that the mentioned 
legal principles, which only limit the applicability of the legal order in certain ways, 
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It seems that Vaihinger did actually have a sense of the difference between the 
“fictions” of the legislator and the mathematical fictions. He obfuscated this dif-
ference for himself by first correctly juxtaposing legal science and mathematical 
cognition, then, however, by dealing with constructs of the legislator and not of le-
gal science. He states: “It is, however, much easier for legal science to deal with its 
fictions than it is for mathematics: in the case of legal science actual facts stand in 
opposition to arbitrary legal rules; thus, a transformation is quite easy. One simply 
has to think that the matter were as such.” However, here we do not have to deal 
with a “transformation” at all; the legislator—and with him everyone applying the 
law—does not“think” that the matter were as such, he rather decrees whatever he 
wishes. This is how the “matters” become actually, i.e. legally, as they are. Within 
his realm, the legislator is almighty, since his function rests in nothing but his abil-
ity to tie certain legal consequences to legal conditions. A fiction of the legislator 
would thus be as impossible as a fiction of nature itself. After all, the law could only 
be opposed to itself—i.e. to its own reality. This, however, would be nonsensical.
The opposition which is posited in the fictions of legal science (which have to be 
distinguished from “fictions” which are mere abbreviations within legal parlance) 
can occur only in relation to the legal order, to the law as the object and thus to what 
counts as the “actuality” of legal science. As soon as it is translated into an actual 
statement, the construct created by legal science, i.e. the ancillary concept, has to 
imply a claim which stands in opposition to the legal order, which cannot be de-
duced from the legal order. Such a case has been exemplified above in the concept 
of the person. Such a contradiction to the legal order is, of course, impossible in the 
case of the fictions of the legislator, it is only a superficial semblance created by 
mere use of certain words.
We can see from the following example of the praetorian fiction of Roman Law 
that Vaihinger himself actually had the opposition to the legal order in mind when 
he spoke of juridic fictions. He quotes Pauly’s Realenzyklopädie des klassischen 
Altertums, III, p. 473: “The Romans called fictio a facilitation of the circumvention 
of the law allowed by praetorian law, which consisted in the license that under cer-
tain circumstances some condition demanded by strict law can be considered to be 
fulfilled, even though it has not actually been fulfilled. Thereby certain legal con-
sequences ensue, even though the conditioning facts have not occurred in the way 
demanded by the law”.Vaihinger comments as follows: “This explanation mutatis 
mutandis neatly fits the scientific fiction in the narrower sense; here, too, a facili-
tation and circumvention of difficulties takes place, which here, too, is a conse-
quence of the very complex state of affairs: here, too, the demands of the strict laws 
of logic are circumvented, here, too, consequences and practical conclusions occur, 
which are correct, despite that which is presupposed is itself incorrect.”However, 
neither Pauly’s description of the “fictio”, nor Vaihinger’s conclusions drawn from 
it are entirely correct. The conclusions drawn depend on the claim that the Praeto-
rian fiction is a “circumvention of law”, and that it posits an opposition to what the 
law demands. However, this is not the case, as the Praetor himself is a legislative 
organ, since he—by means of constitutional law—does not only apply the law, but 




























































H. Kelsen and C. Kletzer12
which according to the ius strictum only a civis can do as if he were a civis, this 
means nothing but the following: a legal norm has been posited, in which certain 
rights and duties of the civis are extended to the peregrinus and this legal norm 
can be formulated without any reference to an ‘As-If’ and without any fiction: the 
peregrinus is allowed to levy the claim just as the civis is. The “consequences and 
practical conclusions” which here occur, are not “correct”, despite the conditions 
being incorrect, but only because the conditions, too, are “correct”, i.e. lawful, and 
are in line with the new legal rule created by the Praetor. The mistake made here is 
to take the strict ius civile as the only element of the legal order, just as if the Prae-
torian law—as fully valid, objective law—were not part of it. The right to institute 
an action by the peregrinus cannot contradict the legal order, since it itself rests on 
one of its rules! However, at least one fiction can be uncovered here: the fiction that 
the Praetor does not make law, but that he only applies the law. As someone merely 
applying the jus civile the Praetor, in granting the peregrinus the right to institute 
an action which only the civis has, would set a contradiction to the legal order 
which consisted entirely in the jus civile. And this contradiction which occurs in 
the application of law would have to hide beneath a fiction. This fiction, however, 
does not consist in the claim that the peregrinus actually is a civis, but in the claim 
that the legal order also grants the right to institute an action to the peregrinus. The 
Praetor in no way denies the difference between the civis and the peregrinus in 
general. He only denies it—insofar as he presents himself as someone applying the 
law—in terms of standing, i.e. he claims: the peregrinus, too, has standing. How-
ever, this fiction becomes superfluous, nay, impossible, in the very moment that 
the other fiction falls away, the fiction that treats the Praetor as someone merely 
applying the law and not as a delegated legislator.
1.4  III
From what has been said so far it should emerge that as concerns the possibil-
ity of a fiction—which depends on the possibility of a contradiction to the legal 
order—the application of the law differs from legislation. In relation to the legal 
norms someone applying the law actually does face a situation very much like the 
one mathematics faces in relation to concepts like circles, ellipses, the warped or 
straight line, etc. The judge, the businessman, cannot arbitrarily extend and restrict 
the legal norms, in other words: they cannot tie arbitrary legal consequences to arbi-
trary legal conditions. If one wishes to subsume a certain case under a norm, which 
does not capture this case, then a fiction may seem expedient: to treat the case as 
if it fell under the legal norm. If the law threatens a sanction for the damaging of a 
public telegraph, but leaves a similar damaging of a public telephone without threat 
of sanction, or if it threatens the delict with—in the view of the person or organ 
applying the law—too mild a sanction, then it is a fiction if the judge applies to 
someone who damages a public telephone a sanction, which the law had intended 





























































1 On the Theory of Juridic Fictions. With Special … 13
to protect the telegraph to protect the telephone; the judge here does not proceed 
as if the telegraph were a telephone, this is not what the judge claims and wants to 
claim, but he proceeds as if the law threatened the same sanction to a damaging of 
a telephone as it does to the damaging of a telegraph. The juridic fiction can only 
involve a fictitious legal claim, and not a fictitious actual claim. After all, the judge 
has to explicitly determine the facts and must not ignore that a telephone and not a 
telegraph was damaged. His claim, which stands in opposition to the legal order and 
not to actual reality, is: the public telephone, too, must not be damaged. Claiming 
the validity of an—invalid—general norm is the means by which he reaches the cor-
rect judgement, at least the one intended by him. It is not the claim that a telephone 
is a telegraph.
The fact that the application of the law can include legal fictions, derives from 
the fact, that it itself presupposes legal cognition, or, put more correctly, that the 
compound act of legal application includes an element of legal cognition. However, 
it has to remain doubtful whether these fictions of the application of the law—which 
are identical with the cases of interpretation by means of analogy—are similar to 
the epistemological fictions in the sense that the latter reach a correct conclusion—
and be it by means of an explicitly incorrect idea. After all, the “correctness” of 
legal application can only mean legality, and not utility. The fiction that the warped 
line is a straight line is a mathematically correct result. It would have to be a legally 
correct, i.e. a lawful result which is reached by means of the analogous-fictitious 
interpretation. Now, the legality of this result can only be measured against the legal 
order itself; however, the contradiction to the legal order in the case of a fictitious-
analogous application of law is not merely a provisional, correctible one, but a 
definite one, one which cannot be corrected in due course. Now, Vaihinger claims 
as a central feature of the fiction, “that these (fictitious) concepts either historically 
become obsolete or logically fall away.” “Insofar as we deal with an opposition to 
actual reality, a fiction can only be of value as long as it is employed provisionally 
…” And he says particularly about semi-fictions: “That is why … a correction has 
to step in; since without such a correction they would not be applicable to the actual 
world. 27 Of the juridic fictions, however, he claims that such a correction is not nec-
essary. After all, in this case we do not deal with the exact estimation of actual real-
ity, but with the subsumption under an arbitrary law, a human artifact, not a natural 
law, not a natural relation.28 However, it is thereby by no means established that the 
correction of juridic fictions in case of the application of the law is superfluous! For 
the intellectual activity that makes use of the juridic fiction (fictions of legislation 
as well as the fictions of the application of law) cannot be seen to be an estimation 
of actual reality. This, however, can only have the consequence that there is no need 
for an opposition to actual reality and for an epistemological fiction in Vaihinger’s 
sense. Insofar as epistemological fictions are possible as “juridic” fictions, they 
can only be fictions of the cognition of the law. And for them the contradiction, 






























































H. Kelsen and C. Kletzer14
“actual reality”, the object of cognition of legal science. This kind of contradiction, 
however, is just as much and just for the same reasons in need of correction, as the 
analogous contradiction in the case of physical, mathematical or otherwise (in the 
broader sense) scientific fictions, since without such a correction the juridic fic-
tion would be just as inapplicable to the legal order, i.e. to the actuality of juridic 
cognition, as the other fictions would be inapplicable to nature. The fictions of the 
application of law—i.e. the analogical interpretation—, conversely, sets an irresolv-
able opposition to the legal order. It is not a detour, which in the end leads us to 
the “actuality” of the law, but an error, which might lead to what the feigning actor 
thinks helpful and expedient, but which never leads to the object of legal science: 
the law. For this very reason, the justification of this kind of juridic fiction, i.e. the 
fiction of the application of law, has to be seen to be theoretically impossible. This 
needs to be expressly stressed since Vaihinger wants to include in particular these 
juridic fictions as equal and equivalent phenomena into his system and his theory of 
fictions, which, after all, by and large intends to be an apology of fictions.
However, what needs to be considered is that in fact such an inadmissible fiction 
only occurs, as soon as an undeniable and irresolvable opposition to the legal order 
is posited. This is not the case in all of those instances of analogical applications of 
law where the legal order allows for, indeed under certain circumstances requires, 
an analogy. Now, whether this is expressly stipulated in a legal norm, like, for in-
stance, in Article 7 of the Austrian Civil Code, or whether one relies only on a norm 
of customary law or—in the cases in which one does not rest one’s claim on positive 
law—on a natural principle of law, does not matter, since an opposition to the legal 
order—and thus a fiction—is impossible as soon as the legal order itself allows for 
the application of the analogy and thus also demands the decision reached by means 
of the analogy. One should not forget that no jurist, who declares the analogy to be 
admissible, will ever decline to let the decision reached by analogous interpretation 
be called law. This, however, means: the statement, which demands the analogy, 
has to be claimed to be a legal norm. The establishment of the existence of such a 
legal norm is, of course, an entirely different matter. In the light of legal theory a 
fiction of the legislator is thus impossible, a fiction of someone applying the law is 
completely inadmissible, since it is in violation of the purpose of the law.
1.5  IV
In order to demonstrate that the fictions of the application of the law do not belong 
within Vaihinger’s system of fictions, it needs to be stated, that cognition of law—
which alone can lead to a fiction in the true sense of the term—only plays a subor-
dinate role in the application of law. It is not the essence, the actual purpose of this 
activity, but only the means by which it reaches its goal. The application of law, just 
as the creation of law, does not really intend the cognition of law, but its realisation, 
it is about acts of the will. The cognition of law, the theory of law, only prepares the 





























































1 On the Theory of Juridic Fictions. With Special … 15
Now, Vaihinger may himself have made a distinction between legal theory and 
legal practice.29 However, he overlooked the principled difference between the truly 
epistemological fictions of legal science and the pseudo-fictions of legal practice. 
What is more, Vaihinger nearly exclusively concerned himself with the so-called 
“fictions” of legal practice. Still, at least some fictions of legal theory can be found 
in his work. Unfortunately, they are most of the time only sketched out by a catch-
word and presented without further analysis. He especially missed out on an analy-
sis of the legal person in general and of the legal person of the state in particular.30 
The fictions of “freedom” and of the “social contract” establishing the state, which 
Vaihinger also deems necessary for the establishment of public criminal law, are 
not fictions of legal theory, but ethical fictions. The “right” of the state, to pun-
ish, demands a moral, and not a juridic justification; and the freedom of the will 
as a foundation of this right is by no means a necessary ethical fiction. Since the 
principle of general prevention or deterrence, too, which Vaihinger mentions, is a 
justification of punishment, which rightfully exists without any fiction of freedom. 
The “fiction” of freedom only emerges when one mistakenly applies a normative 
category to the—causally determined—natural reality, when one illicitly and syn-
cretistically combines an is with an ought, a syncretism which, at least for the sake 
of juridic cognition, is certainly superfluous. One acts or is going to act in a certain 
way (consideration of is), only if one can act in this way, or if one must act in this 
way. The statement which declares that a certain act actually will happen (in the 
future), even though this act has been seen to be impossible, posits a contradiction 
to the object it tries to capture in the statement: to actual reality; it is thus inad-
missible and worthless. However, the statement: someone ought to act in a certain 
way, never posits a contradiction—be it to actual reality, or to any other object of 
cognition—not even in the case in which the action, which ought to be performed, 
appears to be impossible. Only if one ignores the difference between is and ought 
(as two distinct forms of cognitions) and takes the possibility of being actual as a 
conditions of an ought-statement, only then the illusion is created that there existed 
a contradiction between the statement, which posits that something ought to be, 
and the statement, which claims as a matter of fact that this something is actually 
impossible; only then the following error emerges: that a certain content (the action 
which ought to occur) has to be actually possible, the actor thus has to be feigned to 
be free, in order to make possible the statement of ought, and thereby to simultane-
ously make possible the duty to act and maybe even the duty to act differently than 
one actually acts, differently than one actually must or can act. A methodological 
error leads to the fiction of freedom, which becomes superfluous as soon as one 
acknowledges this error. This is the only way to explain the curious fact that a strict 
opposition between the freedom within ethics and jurisprudence, on the one hand, 
and the un-freedom within natural science, on the other, could emerge, yet could at 
the same time be ignored by both sides. The ethical fiction of freedom thus is useful 



























































H. Kelsen and C. Kletzer16
is in this way that Vaihinger’s second main characteristic of the fiction must seem 
so very fitting: “If there is a contradiction to actual reality, the fiction can only be of 
value if it is used provisionally. Until experience is enriched, or until the methods of 
thought are sufficiently sharpened, to be able to replace these provisional methods 
with definite ones.”31
Vaihinger does not capture the fiction of the social contract establishing the state 
correctly, when he claims: “The state does not want to base its coercive law on mere 
might, not even on purely utilitarian grounds, but it wants to establish it as true 
right: this, however, is possible only by means of the fiction of a contract: after all, 
the jurist knows of no other rights than those emerging from contracts.” However, 
the fiction of the social contract establishing the state, just as the fiction of freedom, 
does not actually serve the juridic justification of the coercive functions of the state. 
After all, such a juridic justification contains nothing but the fact that something is 
derived from a juridic norm. However, what is demanded here is the justification of 
the legal norm, i.e. of the norm which orders the infliction of coercion itself. This 
justification is effected by means of a higher, extra-legal norm: the moral or “natu-
ral” fundamental principle: pacta sunt sevanda. This is the reason why the contract 
has to be feigned, and not because the jurist allegedly knows no other law than that 
which emerges from contract. Moreover, the latter statement is factually mistaken. 
The contract is but one of many matters of facts, to which the legal order attaches 
rights and duties.
The social contract establishing the state thus is in fact no fiction of legal theory, 
but an ethical fiction, a fiction of a moral world-view. A jurisprudential perspective 
has to drop precisely such a fiction and the imagination of an ethical justification 
of the law.
1.6  V
After all, legal science—as cognition of a particular object—can only be possible if 
one assumes the sovereignty of the law (or, which is the same, of the state), i.e. if one 
takes the legal order as an independent system of norms which is not dependent on 
any higher order. Otherwise only a moral science (ethics) or theology would be pos-
sible, depending on whether one takes the law to be a result of morality or religion. 
(As long as we consider the law to be an order, a complex of norms, we do not need 
to consider here a possible natural science or sociology of law, which clearly would 
also have to be considered a science of law). Now, Vaihinger thinks that a fiction lies 
precisely in this separation of law from morals. The als. The “fictitious isolation”, 
that occurs in the positivistic view (i.e. in a view which presumes the law to be an 
independent, sovereign order), was “the provisional departure from an integrated 































































1 On the Theory of Juridic Fictions. With Special … 17
of law and morality as two distinct realms might be of high value, however, one 
should not forget, that here the “in fact” had to be replaced by an “as-if”. “Since, 
however one wants to determine the relation of these two very important areas of 
life, one can hardly reach the conclusion that these two, as a matter of fact, have no 
relation to each other whatsoever. This comment is of particular importance, as due 
to a lack of methodological insight jurists regularly take this fiction to be an actual 
relation, which is a disastrous error. The one-sided approach can do many a good 
service to legal science and the practical life of the law, however, at a certain point 
the abstraction, which has been provisionally made, always needs to be replaced 
with full actual reality being reinstated.”33 However, this view cannot—especially 
not from the point of view of Vaihinger’s own theory of fictions—be agreed with. 
After all, the claim that the law was a system of norms which is independent from 
morality, which in its normative validity is not reducible to an ethical order, can for 
the very reason not be a “provisional” departure from an integrated part of reality, as 
nether law nor morality—both being considered as complexes of norms—are part 
of the realm of that actuality, which for Vaihinger is the benchmark from which the 
fiction departs, and which is identical with nature, with the world of the senses, and 
as neither legal science nor ethics try to capture this actuality in their objects. The 
relation of law and morality is in no sense a relation between two “realms of life” 
as two parts of natural reality. Their “actual” relation is no relation in actuality, i.e. 
in reality which can be captured by natural science understood in the broadest sense 
and also including social sciences. The juridic perspective which Vaihinger accuses 
of committing a fictitious isolation, cannot depart from an integrated part of actual-
ity, not even in determining the relation of its object to morality, since it does not 
even have actuality in view. However, insofar as law and morality are considered 
as—social—facts, as “actual” going-ons in nature (and it remains an open question 
whether this is at all possible), they are not objects of specific juridic cognition, or 
of normative ethics. And in this sense the related fictitious isolation cannot take 
place at all. There is no need for it at all. For an inquiry of the actuality of the so-
called experience of law, of the factual moral ideas and the “moral” actions effected 
by them—its methodological possibility simply assumed—law and morality are 
something completely different than what these two same words denote as objects 
of normative legal science and ethics. And for an act of cognition aiming at actual 
psychological facts and actions there can be no fundamental difference between an 
actuality called “law” and an actuality called “morality”, and certainly no expedi-
ency of a fictitious isolation of both, and be it only a provisional one. Vis-a-vis a 
juridic perspective such a “full actual reality” can never be “given back its rights”.
Now, for Vaihinger the representation of a legal order—as a complex of norms of 
ought—just as the representation of a moral order appears as a fiction. According to 
him concepts like norm, duty, the ideal etc. have to be subsumed under the class of 
practical fictions.34 Now, even though Vaihinger does not extensively engage with 
the concept of a legal norm, of the legal ought and of the legal duty, etc. it should 
33 Ibid 375.






























































H. Kelsen and C. Kletzer18
be assumed that we can say the same about them as we can say about the ethical 
concepts, which Vaihinger all expresses as fictions. Thus, one could say with Vai-
hinger: the jurist treats the law, as if it were a sum of ought-norms. However, if this 
is a fiction, if the law in actuality is not an ought-norm, what is the law “in actual-
ity”? And moreover: What is an ought-norm? Put differently: if the assumption that 
the law as an ought-norm is a fiction, then the law needs to be able to be something 
else, something “actual”, and then the “ought-norm” has to be something “actual”; 
however, it has to be something else than the law “actually is” and the ought-norm 
must not itself in turn be a fiction. Since the fiction obviously consists in a likening, 
i.e. in the erroneous identification of something actual with something else which is 
actual. To put it in the formula of a fiction: X is treated, as if it were Y (even though 
X is not Y); this means, however, that both X and Y have to be actual, or they have 
to be claimed to be actual. It is not their existence but only the identification which 
is fictitious. In Vaihinger the formula of fiction is the following: “In this formula it 
is stated, that some given actual entity, some particular thing was likened to some-
thing else, the impossibility or non-reality of which is at the same time claimed … 
e.g. in the juridic fiction the formula is as follows: this heir is  is to be treated as he 
would have been treated had he died before his father, the bequeather, i.e. he is to be 
disinherited”What is relevant in this context  is only the insight that both elements, 
the “heir” and “the one having died before the bequeather” in and for themselves, 
i.e. irrespective of their position in the relationship of the fiction, are something ac-
tual. Vaihinger continues: “What is expressed here is, first and foremost, a likening, 
i.e. the invitation to perform a likening or a subsumption; such a statement initially 
claims nothing else but the following: man is to be considered as a gorilla. But why 
should he be considered as such? Simply because he is like a gorilla. All other cases 
are like this one: we are invited to liken something to something else, however, 
together with this invitation we are also made aware that the likening rests on an 
impossible condition; however, instead of declining to undertake the likening, it is 
nevertheless still performed, albeit for other reasons.35 The fiction consists in the 
likening of two actualities, despite the impossibility of this likening.
However, the law from the very beginning is nothing actual. There is no part of 
natural reality which can be called law. And even if one wanted to disregard this 
fact, and wanted to still consider the law, as if it were an ought-norm, the question 
emerges, what an ought-norm actually is? Well, nothing actual, but itself a fiction. 
And the fiction here does not only consist in the ‘as-if’ formula, but also in that, to 
which the law is likened by means of a fiction. The fiction, the fictitious statement, 
claims—in the statement which starts with the as if—the actuality of something 
(and be it in opposition to the latter). The analysis of every fiction has to lead to cer-
tain elements of actual reality, which may be erroneously connected, but still exist; 
the fiction has to be resolvable, or otherwise it hovers in mid air.
Thus it has to appear as if the characteristics of the concepts of a fiction, which 
Vaihinger himself established, do not really fit his “practical fictions”. Basically, 































































1 On the Theory of Juridic Fictions. With Special … 19
concerns the concepts of the ethical world order, of duty, the ideal and some others. 
However, in the case of all these concepts precisely that element, which according 
to Vaihinger is essential to the fictions, is missing: the contradiction to actual reality. 
After all, a contradiction to actual reality can only exist, when something actual is 
claimed, when something actual is at all to be known. Vaihinger states: “The ideal 
is a conceptual construct which is both inherently contradictory and stands in con-
tradiction with actual reality, which, however, has tremendous, world-transcending 
value. The ideal is a practical fiction.”36 This could be said of any ethical or juridic 
concept, since it can be said of the concept of the ought, which is identical with the 
formal concept of the ideal. However, where can we find the contradiction with 
actual reality in any ought-statement, even in one which has something actually 
impossible as its content? The statement which expresses an ideal, a duty, an ethical 
demand: e.g. X ought to be charitable, and the statement describing actual reality: 
e.g. X is not charitable, are not contradicting each other in any way. Even if one 
concedes—and one has to concede this—that everything which happens, has to 
happen as it happens, and cannot happen otherwise, so that any ought which has 
a different content than the is would demand something impossible, no contradic-
tion between is and ought would be present. The fact of a is only contradicted by 
the fact of non-a and not by the ought of non-a. Unless one wanted to resolve the 
ought-statement into an as-if-statement and claimed that in saying that a ought to 
be, I act as if a were the case; and if I claim: X ought to be charitable, I feign X (in 
thought) as actually being charitable, even though in reality he is not charitable. 
Ought would then be a feigned is. However, this view is obviously incorrect. In the 
representation of ought we make use of a form completely different from the repre-
sentation of an is, a form which can take any arbitrary content without getting into 
logical opposition to any representation of an is, which has an opposing content. 
Rather than calling the ought a feigned is, I could, with the same legitimacy, call the 
is a feigned ought. This is why a normative concept can be inherently contradictory, 
however it cannot possibly contradict reality. After all, normative cognition is not 
directed at actual reality at all. Of course, within normative cognition fictions can 
very well exist, i.e. concepts can exist that are opposed to the specific object of cog-
nition. However, this object of cognition itself and the entire activity of cognition 
cannot be called fictions. The concepts “god and conscience” may be fictions. The 
“ought”, the “duty” and the “norm” certainly cannot. This is clearly shown, as soon 
as one tries to present the “fiction” of a duty in an “as if” statement: we ought to act 
as if it were our duty to act in a certain way. However, already in the first clause: we 
ought to act, we find included the assertion of a duty. The statement would thus be: 
we are under a duty to act as if we were under a duty. Duty and ought are identical. 
However, does the statement: we ought to act in a certain way, have the meaning of 
a fiction? It would indeed have such a meaning if we were to claim: we act in such 
a way, even though we do not act in such a way. However, precisely this assertion is 
not involved, but rather the following: we ought to act in such a way, even though 
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It is an entirely different question, whether and how the claims expressed in 
ought-statements can be demonstrated or proven, whether not every system of 
norms was ultimately based on a basic ought statement which is not provable. This 
can be conceded without thereby conceding the character of a fiction, i.e. of a con-
tradiction to actuality (as natural reality).
The concept of the ought—and with it the concepts of a duty, of a norm, of 
the ideal, of (objective) value—could be called fictions, would we not by a fiction 
understand a construct which serves the cognition of actual reality, and at the same 
time posits a contradiction to precisely this actual reality. And ought statements—
the ethical just as the legal—are “fictions” only if by a fiction we understand ev-
erything which is not the expression, and particularly a consistent expression, of 
natural reality. So, even if we can concede to Vaihinger that legal norms—just as 
the entire world of the ought—are imaginative products of the human mind, phan-
tasy constructs which have to be contrasted from the empirical world of the natural 
being,37 a contradiction to this actuality, which is the first of his “basic features”, 
by which one can “immediately detect every fiction”,38 by no means becomes nec-
essary. It is precisely in the category of the ought that a form is being created, in 
which the phantasy can unfold without any contradiction to actual reality. On the 
other hand the world of the ought has to count as an object of (ethical and juridic) 
cognition, as its own variety of actual reality, which, albeit different from, must 
nevertheless be seen as equal with, natural reality, if there is to be a true fiction.
Vaihinger has thus illustrated his brilliant theory by precisely those juridic fic-
tions (i.e. those of legislation and application of the law), the discovery of the nature 
and cognitive value of which on closer inspection cannot be seen to be his greatest 
merit. On the other hand, legal science knows of other, by all means analogous 
auxiliary concepts. However, it is not legal science which sheds a light on those 
fictions—as Vaihinger thinks—but vice versa: the true, theoretical fictions of legal 
science become more comprehensible only through the fictions of mathematic and 
other sciences. The fictions of legal theory have nothing specifically juridical to 
them at all, they do not constitute a method characteristic to legal science.
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